Nash Bargaining Over Margin Loans to Kelly Gamblers by Garivaltis, Alex
Nash Bargaining Over Margin Loans to
Kelly Gamblers
Alex Garivaltis∗
Northern Illinois University
September 4, 2019
Abstract
I derive practical formulas for optimal arrangements between sophisticated
stock market investors (continuous-time Kelly gamblers or, more generally,
CRRA investors) and the brokers who lend them cash for leveraged bets on
a high Sharpe asset (i.e. the market portfolio). Rather than, say, the broker
posting a monopoly price for margin loans, the gambler agrees to use a greater
quantity of margin debt than he otherwise would in exchange for an interest
rate that is lower than the broker would otherwise post. The gambler thereby
attains a higher asymptotic capital growth rate and the broker enjoys a greater
rate of intermediation profit than would obtain under non-cooperation.
If the threat point represents a complete breakdown of negotiations (re-
sulting in zero margin loans), then we get an elegant rule of thumb: r∗L =
(3/4) r + (1/4)
(
ν − σ2/2), where r is the broker’s cost of funds, ν is the
compound-annual growth rate of the market index, and σ is the annual volatil-
ity. We show that, regardless of the particular threat point, the gambler will
negotiate to size his bets as if he himself could borrow at the broker’s call rate.
Keywords: Nash Bargaining; Margin Loans; Kelly Betting; Log-Optimal
Portfolios; Continuously-Rebalanced Portfolios; Net Interest Margin
JEL Classification Codes: C78; D42; G11; G21; G24
r∗L =
r
2
+
µ′Σ−1µ− r2 · 1′Σ−11− 2 (Γ− pi)
4 [1′Σ−1(µ− r1)− 1] . (1)
∗Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, School of Public and Global Affairs, College of
Liberal Arts and Sciences, Northern Illinois University, 514 Zulauf Hall, DeKalb IL 60115. E-mail:
agarivaltis1@niu.edu. Homepage: http://garivaltis.com. ORCID iD: 0000-0003-0944-8517.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
06
62
8v
2 
 [e
co
n.G
N]
  3
0 A
ug
 20
19
1 Introduction.
Harry Markowitz’ fundamental mean-variance theory (Markowitz 1952) of invest-
ment transforms the n-dimensional portfolio hyperplane into his trademark (two-
dimensional) mean-variance plane. Even better, the Markowitz bullet gives us a
one-dimensional frontier of efficient portfolios that yield the greatest possible reward
for any given level of risk. And given the freedom to borrow and lend cash, we need
only focus on a single fund of risky assets that gives the greatest reward per unit of
risk; the curvature of the Markowitz bullet is thereby replaced by the straightness
of the capital market line. But the theory ends there; the practitioner receives no
further prescription than to just borrow and buy as many shares of the tangency
portfolio as is permitted by his particular appetite for risk.
This lack of guidance in one-dimensional gambling problems was acutely felt by
card-counter Edward O. Thorp, who required an appropriate criterion for sizing his
bets in certain favorable situations (Thorp 1966) that he found at the Nevada black-
jack tables (cf. with his 2017 autobiography). The correct answer (“Fortune’s For-
mula,” Poundstone 2010) is called the Kelly criterion, after John Kelly (1956), a
physicist at Bell Labs. As was the custom in statistical communication theory, Kelly
started with a simple example that turned out to be typical of the whole situation. He
considered a long sequence of independent bets on horse races whereby the gambler
knows the (stationary) win probabilities to more precision than the posted (even)
odds. This illuminating environment led him to formulate the concept of a fixed-
fraction betting scheme, whereby the gambler bets the same fraction of his wealth
on each race. His famous criterion singles out the fixed-fraction betting scheme (or
“Kelly bet”) that generates the highest possible asymptotic per-bet capital growth
rate. In blackjack, say, the Kelly fraction is b∗ := p − q, where p is the chance of
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winning the next hand and q is the chance of losing. For instance, if you have a
p := 50.5% chance of winning the next hand, the criterion dictates that you should
bet 1% of your net worth at even odds.
Kelly’s theory extends easily to Black-Scholes (1973) markets whereby the asset
price St follows a geometric Brownian motion. In this environment, the gambler
“bets” the fixed fraction b of his wealth on the stock over each differential time step
[t, t+dt]. Apart from the fact that we now have a continuum of possible profit-and-loss
outcomes
dSt := St × (µ dt+ σdWt) (2)
d (logSt) =
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
dt+ σ dWt, (3)
the correct behavior is governed by substantially the same logic (cf. with Alex Gari-
valtis 2018, Garivaltis 2019a-c, and Ordentlich and Cover 1998), since the random
fluctuations dWt :=  ×
√
dt are identically (normally) distributed and independent
across time.
It is well known (cf. with Edward O. Thorp 2006) that the Kelly bet for this
market is
b∗ =
µ− r
σ2
=
1
2
+
ν − r
σ2
, (4)
where ν := µ − σ2/2 is the expected geometric growth rate of the asset price and r
is the interest rate at which the gambler can borrow and lend. If we take r := 2.44%
(which is the 1-month U.S. treasury yield as of this writing) along with some stylized
parameters (ν := 0.09, σ := 0.15) meant to represent the behavior of the S&P 500
index, we get b∗ = 3.42. That is, if the gambler himself had the opportunity to borrow
at the risk-free rate, he would borrow $2.42 for every dollar of his own equity.
The author presently borrows from Interactive Brokers at a rate of 3.9% com-
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Table 1: Margin loan interest rates (for U.S. dollars) at Interactive
Brokers, 3/12/2019.
Tier Interest Rate log(1 + Interest Rate) Kelly Bet, b
0-100,000 3.9% 3.83% 2.8
100,000.01-1,000,000 3.4% 3.34% 3.01
1,000,000.01-3,000,000 2.9% 2.86% 3.23
3,000,000.01-200,000,000 2.7% 2.66% 3.32
pounded annually1, or 3.83% compounded continuously, which corresponds to b = 2.8.
However, for a client that is borrowing more than $3 million, the rate changes to
2.7% compounded annually, or 2.66% compounded continuously, with a correspond-
ing Kelly bet of 3.32. All of this is illustrated in Table 1, which gives Interactive
Brokers’ pricing schedule for U.S. dollar margin loans as of 3/12/2019.
1.1 Contribution.
Taking our inspiration from this broker-client relationship (which is both real and
ongoing), we formulate and solve a Nash (1950) bargaining problem between a stock
broker (that can borrow cash on the money market at the broker call rate, r) and a
continuous time Kelly gambler (or, more generally, a CRRA investor) to whom the
broker issues margin loans at a marked-up interest rate rL > r. The present situation
for U.S. retail consumers of margin loans is just this: the broker posts a price rL
(presumably a monopoly price), and the Kelly gambler (i.e. the author) responds by
demanding the corresponding growth-optimal quantity q of margin loans per dollar of
account equity. The corresponding Kelly bet is then b := q+ 1. These choices lead to
a definite (logarithmic) capital growth rate of Γ for the gambler and a definite profit
rate pi for the broker.
1This was on March 12, 2019. The rate has dropped since then, to 3.62% as of August 13, 2019.
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Obviously, the principals should cooperate, if possible, and negotiate a margin loan
contract (b∗, r∗L) that jointly specifies the interest rate, the client’s portfolio, and the
quantity of margin loans to be issued over the differential time step [t, t+ dt]. It would
thereby be possible to convert the deadweight loss of monopoly into some agreed upon
surplus values Γ∗−Γ and pi∗−pi. We show that, regardless of the disagreement point(
pi,Γ
)
, the client will negotiate to bet as if he himself had the opportunity to borrow
at the broker’s cost of funds. We derive exact formulas for the efficient profit-growth
frontier, the negotiated behavior (b∗, r∗L), and the final utilities (pi
∗,Γ∗) that obtain
from Nash’s cooperation scheme. We show that the efficient frontier is a straight
line (whose slope is −1), and therefore our bargaining problem is one of transferable
utility (cf. with Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995). We find that the Nash
bargaining solution given here coincides with the Egalitarian solution, whereby all
surplus value gained from cooperation is shared equally; the correct outcome (pi∗,Γ∗)
on the profit-growth frontier is found by intersecting it with a 45° line emanating from
the threat point
(
pi,Γ
)
.
2 Definitions and Notation.
As indicated above, we consider a Black-Scholes (1973) market with a single risk asset
(i.e. the S&P 500 index) whose price St follows the geometric Brownian motion
dSt
St
:= µ dt+ σdWt, (5)
where µ is the annual drift rate, σ is the volatility, and Wt is a standard Brownian
motion. We consider a broker that makes margin loans at a continuously-compounded
interest rate of rL per year, and whose cost of funds (“broker call rate”) is denoted
4
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by r. The broker makes these loans to a continuous-time Kelly (1956) gambler (cf.
with David Luenberger 1998) whose behavior is characterized by the fact that he
continuously maintains some fixed level b of exposure to the risk asset. That is, the
gambler continuously maintains the fraction b of his wealth in the stock; if b > 1
then he continuously maintains a margin (debit) balance in the amount of b − 1 of
his wealth. For instance, if b := 1.5 then the gambler’s margin loan balance would be
continuously adjusted so as to constitute 50% of his wealth. We let Vt(b) denote the
gambler’s wealth process, where V0 is some given initial wealth. The (dollar) quantity
of margin loans demanded is q := (b− 1)Vt(b). The broker’s instantaneous rate of
profit per year is pi (b, rL) := (rL − r) q = (rL − r) (b− 1)Vt(b), where rL − r is the
net interest margin.
We will assume that the client’s objective is to maximize the almost-sure continuously-
compounded asymptotic growth rate of his capital, i.e. Γ := lim
t→∞
(1/t) log [Vt(b)/V0].
As we will see presently (cf. with David Luenberger 1998), this is equivalent to
maximizing the drift of log Vt(b). The gambler’s fortune evolves according to
dVt(b)
Vt(b)
= b
dSt
St
− (b− 1)rL dt = [rL + (µ− rL)b] dt+ bσ dWt. (6)
Since the gambler’s fortune follows a geometric Brownian motion, one can apply Itoˆ’s
Lemma (cf. with Paul Wilmott 2001) to obtain the relation
d (log Vt(b)) =
[
rL + (µ− rL) b− σ
2
2
b2
]
dt+ bσ dWt, (7)
or, equivalently,
Vt(b) = V0 × exp
{[
rL + b (µ− rL)− σ
2
2
b2
]
t+ bσWt
}
. (8)
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Accordingly, the gambler’s asymptotic growth rate will be denoted Γ (b, rL):
Γ (b, rL) := rL + b (µ− rL)− σ
2
2
b2 = lim
t→∞
log [Vt(b)/V0]
t
=
E [d (log Vt(b))]
dt
. (9)
3 Nash Bargaining.
In what follows, we will assume that at every instant t, the broker and the Kelly
gambler will Nash bargain (Nash 1950) over the margin loan arrangement (b, rL),
which simultaneously specifies the quantity of margin loans q = (b− 1)Vt and the
interest rate rL that will be charged by the broker over the differential time step
[t, t+ dt]. We let
(
pi,Γ
)
:=
(
pi
(
b, rL
)
,Γ
(
b, rL
))
denote the threat point, meaning that
a breakdown in negotiations will lead to the broker charging rL and to the gambler
betting the fraction b of his wealth on the stock over [t, t+ dt]. Non-cooperation
would thereby lead to a profit rate of pi = pi
(
b, rL
)
for the broker and a growth rate
of Γ = Γ
(
b, rL
)
for the gambler.
Example 1. Rather than cooperate, the broker posts a take-it-or-leave-it price rL ≥ r,
and the client chooses the corresponding Kelly bet (or log-optimal portfolio)
b∗ (rL) :=
µ− rL
σ2
= arg max
b≥1
Γ (b, rL) , (10)
where we must assume that µ− σ2 ≥ rL ≥ r in order to guarantee that the client will
take a margin loan. This means that the risk asset must be sufficiently favorable (high
drift and low volatility) in relation to the cost of funds, and also the interest rate rL
must be sufficiently low that the client does not choose b = 1. The quantity of margin
6
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loans (per dollar of client equity) is
q =
µ− rL
σ2
− 1, (11)
the broker’s instantaneous rate of profit per unit time is
pi =
(
µ− rL
σ2
− 1
)
(rL − r) , (12)
and, after simplification, the gambler’s asymptotic capital growth rate is
Γ = rL +
1
2
(
µ− rL
σ
)2
. (13)
Example 2. After a complete breakdown of negotiations, the broker does not even
offer the client a margin loan (say, rL := ∞, or the client refuses to take a loan).
Thus, the client just buys and holds the stock (b = 1, q = 0, pi = 0), achieving an
asymptotic growth rate of Γ = µ− σ2/2.
Note that the total non-cooperation of Example 2 is not a credible threat (e.g. it
is not subgame-perfect), because if the broker posts a reasonable price (as in Example
1), then the investor will optimally choose to borrow to the extent possible.
Naturally, a negotiated contract has the potential to make both parties better
off: the client will agree to use more margin debt in exchange for a lower interest
rate. The contract will be arranged just so; the gambler achieves a higher asymptotic
growth rate on account of the lower rL and the broker achieves a higher rate of profit
on account of the increased b.
The Nash product (cf. with John Nash 1950) is equal to
N (b, rL) := [pi (b, rL)− pi]×
[
Γ (b, rL)− Γ
]
, (14)
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and the Nash bargaining solution is equal to
(b∗, r∗L) := arg max
{b≥1, rL≥r}
N (b, rL) . (15)
Note that, since pi (•, •) is directly proportional to Vt(b), any Nash bargain that is
struck for the duration of the differential time step [t, t+ dt] will be independent of
the client’s wealth level Vt(b); the negotiated behavior (b
∗, r∗L) depends only on the
GBM parameters (µ, σ), the broker’s cost of funds (r), and the threat point
(
pi,Γ
)
2.
We should stress the fact that, although the client’s welfare is measured in terms
of his asymptotic almost sure capital growth rate (which is equal to his instantaneous
expected compound-growth rate), the broker’s welfare is measured by its instanta-
neous rate of intermediation profit per dollar of client equity. Because this profit
amounts to a fixed percentage of the client’s wealth (e.g. the net interest margin
times the client’s debt-to-equity ratio), the asymptotic growth rate of the broker’s fee
income is in fact equal to client’s long run capital growth rate, Γ.
The first-order condition ∂N/∂rL = 0 simplifies to
Γ (b, rL)− Γ = pi (b, rL)− pi, (16)
e.g. the asymptotic growth rate that the gambler gains from cooperation must be
equal to the rate of profit (per dollar of client equity) that the broker gains relative
to the threat point. Taking the other first-order condition ∂N/∂b = 0 and using (16)
to simplify, we get
Proposition 1. Under Nash bargaining, regardless of the threat point, the Kelly
2The principals are assumed to re-negotiate the margin loan contract after every differential tick
dt of the market clock. However, the Nash bargaining solution never actually changes, on account
of the fact that the Nash product is directly proportional to the client’s wealth Vt(b).
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gambler will bet the fraction
b∗ =
µ− r
σ2
, (17)
e.g. he will negotiate to bet as if he himself could borrow at the broker’s call rate, r.
Note that the negotiated bet size b∗ = (µ− r) /σ2 amounts to a special case of the
usual Merton strategy b := (µ − r)/(γσ2) (cf. with Merton 1969 and Merton 1990)
that obtains for an investor with CRRA utility
u(x) :=

(x1−γ − 1) / (1− γ) if γ > 0 and γ 6= 1
log x if γ = 1,
(18)
where γ ≡ −x · u′′(x)/u′(x) denotes the investor’s (constant) coefficient of relative
risk aversion. Substituting this value of b into (16), solving, and simplifying, we get
Theorem 1. The negotiated interest rate under Nash bargaining is given by the for-
mula
r∗L =
r
2
+
µ2 − r2 − 2σ2 (Γ− pi)
4 (µ− σ2 − r) . (19)
Example 3. Under total non-cooperation (pi = 0 and Γ = µ− σ2/2), after factoring
and simplifying, we get
r∗L =
µ+ 3r − σ2
4
=
3
4
r +
1
4
(
ν − σ
2
2
)
, (20)
where ν := µ− σ2/2 is the asymptotic growth rate of the asset price St. The broker’s
rate of profit is
pi =
(
µ− σ2 − r
2σ
)2
. (21)
Example 4. For the parameters σ := 15%, r := 3%, ν := 9%, µ := ν + σ2/2, the
continuous-time Kelly rule is b∗ = 3.17. The negotiated interest rate is r∗L = 4.2%,
9
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the net interest margin is 1.2%, and the gambler achieves an asymptotic continuously-
compounded growth rate of Γ∗ = 12% per year. The broker earns instantaneous margin
loan profits at a rate of pi∗ = 2.6% of the client’s equity per year.
3.1 Utility Possibility Frontier.
In this subsection, we derive the utility possibility frontier, e.g. we calculate the
maximum possible growth rate Γ that is (cooperatively) achievable for a given profit
rate pi. Solving for rL in terms of pi, we get
rL = r +
pi
b− 1 . (22)
Substituting this expression into the formula for Γ, we get, after simplification,
Γ = r + (µ− r) b− σ
2
2
b2 − pi. (23)
Maximizing with respect to b, we obtain b∗ = (µ− r) /σ2. Substituting back into (24)
and simplifying, we get the (linear) equation of the efficient growth-profit frontier:
Γ = r +
1
2
(
µ− r
σ
)2
− pi. (24)
Juxtaposing (24) with the egalitarian condition Γ − Γ = pi − pi, we obtain the fact
that the final utilities under Nash bargaining are
pi∗ =
r − (Γ− pi)
2
+
1
4
(
µ− r
σ
)2
(25)
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and
Γ∗ =
r + Γ− pi
2
+
1
4
(
µ− r
σ
)2
. (26)
4 Monopoly Threat Point.
Remembering that we have normalized the gambler’s fortune to $1, the broker faces
the demand curve
q (rL) = b (rL)− 1 =
( µ
σ2
− 1
)
− 1
σ2
× rL. (27)
The corresponding inverse demand (or marginal value) curve is rL(q) = (µ− σ2)−σ2q,
and the marginal revenue curve is MR(q) = (µ− σ2)−2σ2q. The instantaneous price
elasticity of demand for margin loans is
d(q) = −rL
q
× dq
drL
=
µ− σ2
σ2q
− 1. (28)
Equating the broker’s marginal revenue to the marginal cost r of funding, we obtain
the monopoly quantity
qM =
µ− σ2 − r
2σ2
. (29)
Substituting this quantity into the inverse demand curve, we get the familiar monopoly
midpoint pricing rule:
rM =
µ− σ2 + r
2
. (30)
That is, the monopoly price of margin loans is equal to the average of the choke
point µ− σ2 and the broker call rate r. Thus, under the monopoly threat point, the
11
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continuous-time Kelly gambler will bet the fraction
bM = qM + 1 =
µ+ σ2 − r
2σ2
(31)
of wealth on the risk asset over [t, t+ dt]. Given its net interest margin of rM − r =
(µ− σ2 − r) /2, the broker’s instantaneous rate of intermediation profit per dollar of
client equity is
piM = (rM − r) qM =
(
µ− σ − r
2σ
)2
, (32)
and the gambler’s asymptotic capital growth rate under the monopoly market struc-
ture is
ΓM = Γ (bM , rM) =
µ− σ2 + r
2
+
1
8
(
µ+ σ2 − r
σ
)2
. (33)
Consumer surplus flows to the Kelly gambler at a continuous rate of
CS =
1
8
(
µ− σ2 − r
σ
)2
(34)
per unit time. From the symmetry of the monopoly midpoint, the deadweight loss
per unit time is equal to the consumer surplus:
DWL = CS =
1
8
(
µ− σ2 − r
σ
)2
. (35)
Example 5. For the parameters ν := 0.09, σ := 0.15, µ := ν + σ2/2, r := 0.03, the
monopoly price of margin debt is rM = 5.44%, and the gambler correspondingly would
demand qM = 1.083 dollars of margin loans per dollar of his account equity, for a
total bet of bM = 2.0833. The gambler thereby achieves an asymptotic capital growth
rate of Γ = 10.32% and the broker earns intermediation profits at annual rate of
pi = 2.64% of client equity. This monopoly behavior is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Kelly gambler’s instantaneous demand for margin loans per
dollar of account equity, ν := 0.09, σ := 0.15, µ := ν + σ2/2, r := 0.03.
Under cooperation (relative to this threat point), the gambler ups his bet to b∗ =
3.17 and the broker lowers his interest rate to r∗L = 4.52%. This raises the gambler’s
growth rate to 10.98% and it raises the broker’s profit rate to 3.3%. Thus, the annual
rate of deadweight loss (in the amount of 1.32% of account equity) has been converted
to surplus value and shared equally between the counterparties: Γ−Γ = pi−pi = 0.66%.
This cooperative behavior is illustrated in Figure (2).
5 Several Risk Assets.
In this section, we proceed to extend our main techniques and results to the general
stock market with n correlated risk assets (i := 1, 2, ..., n) in geometric Brownian
13
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Figure 2: Gains from cooperation under Nash bargaining, ν := 0.09, σ :=
0.15, µ := ν + σ2/2, r := 0.03.
motion. Let Sit denote the price of stock i at time t, where
dSit
Sit
:= µi dt+ σi dWit. (36)
µi is the drift of stock i, σi is its volatility, and the (Wit)
n
i=1 are correlated unit
Brownian motions. On that score, we let ρij := Corr (dWit, dWjt), and we let
σij := ρijσiσj = Cov
(
dSit
Sit
,
dSjt
Sjt
)/
dt (37)
denote the covariance of instantaneous returns per unit time. In what follows, we
will let µ := (µ1, ..., µn)
′ denote the drift vector of the stock market, and we will
assume that the covariance matrix Σ := [σij]n×n is invertible. In this generality, a
continuously-rebalanced portfolio (or fixed-fraction betting scheme) is defined by a
14
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vector b := (b1, ..., bn)
′ ∈ Rn of portfolio weights, where the intention is to continuously
execute rebalancing trades so as to maintain the fixed fraction bi of wealth in stock
i at all times. As usual, we let Vt(b) denote the gambler’s fortune at time t; the
instantaneous quantity of margin loans demanded therefore amounts to
q =
(
n∑
i=1
bi − 1
)
Vt(b) = (1
′b− 1)Vt(b), (38)
or just q = 1′b − 1 per dollar of client equity, where 1 := (1, ..., 1)′ is an n × 1
vector of ones. The broker’s instantaneous rate of intermediation profit is now pi =
(1′b− 1) (rL − r) per dollar of client equity. The evolution of the gambler’s fortune
is now governed by the stochastic differential equation
dVt(b)
Vt(b)
:=
n∑
i=1
bi
dSit
Sit
− (1′b− 1) rL dt =
[
rL + (µ− rL1)′ b
]
dt+
n∑
i=1
biσi dWit. (39)
Applying Itoˆ’s Lemma for several diffusion processes (cf. with Paul Wilmott 1998),
we obtain the fact that
d (log Vt(b)) =
[
rL + (µ− rL1)′ b− 1
2
b′Σb
]
dt+
n∑
i=1
biσi dWit, (40)
which, upon integration, yields
Vt(b) = V0 × exp
{[
rL + (µ− rL1)′ b− 1
2
b′Σb
]
t+
n∑
i=1
biσiWit
}
. (41)
In this connection, the gambler’s continuously-compounded asymptotic capital growth
rate is now
Γ (b, rL) := rL + (µ− rL1)′ b− 1
2
b′Σb = lim
t→∞
log [Vt(b)/V0]
t
=
E [d (log Vt(b))]
dt
. (42)
15
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Proceeding as before, the correct behavior is obtained by optimizing the Nash product
N (b, rL):
(b∗, r∗L) := arg max
{1′b≥1, rL≥r}
(pi − pi) (Γ− Γ) . (43)
Using the product rule to calculate ∂N/∂rL, we obtain
(1− 1′b) (pi − pi) + (Γ− Γ) (1′b− 1) = 0. (44)
Assuming interiority (1′b > 1), we cancel the common factor q = 1′b − 1 and again
obtain the egalitarian condition Γ − Γ = pi − pi. Using the product rule to calculate
the gradient ∇bN of the Nash product with respect to b, we get the (vector) condition
(pi − pi) (µ− rL1− Σb) +
(
Γ− Γ) (rL − r) 1 = 0. (45)
Assuming that there are gains to be had from cooperation (meaning that pi − pi and
Γ−Γ are both positive numbers), we cancel this common factor and simplify to obtain
b∗ = Σ−1 (µ− r1) . (46)
As expected, this is precisely the behavior of a continuous time Kelly gambler (cf.
with David Luenberger 1998) who is permitted to borrow cash at the broker’s call
rate, r. Using this fact in conjunction with the egalitarian condition and the defining
expressions for Γ and pi one calculates the negotiated interest rate to be
r∗L =
r
2
+
µ′Σ−1µ− r2 · 1′Σ−11− 2 (Γ− pi)
4 [1′Σ−1 (µ− r1)− 1] , (47)
which is in perfect accord with (19).
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Taking our cue from the univariate case, we can derive the (linear) efficient Γ− pi
frontier in just the same way. For a given rate pi of intermediation profit, we solve for
rL and obtain
rL = r +
pi
1′b− 1 . (48)
Substituting this expression into the definition of Γ, one has, after simplification,
Γ = r + (µ− r1)′ b− 1
2
b′Σb− pi. (49)
Maximizing b out of this expression, we obtain b∗ = Σ−1 (µ− r1); the general equation
of the efficient frontier is
Γ = r +
1
2
(µ− r1)′Σ−1 (µ− r1)− pi. (50)
The final utility vector (Γ∗, pi∗) that obtains from Nash bargaining therefore lies at
the intersection of the efficient frontier (50) and the line Γ = Γ−pi+pi which expresses
the egalitarian division of surplus value. Solving these simultaneous equations, we
get
Γ∗ =
r + Γ− pi
2
+
1
4
(µ− r1)′Σ−1 (µ− r1) (51)
and
pi∗ =
r − (Γ− pi)
2
+
1
4
(µ− r1)′Σ−1 (µ− r1) . (52)
5.1 Monopoly Disagreement Point.
If negotiations break down and the broker simply posts a price rL, then the gambler
will react with the corresponding Kelly rule, namely, b(rL) = Σ
−1 (µ− rL1) . Thus,
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the broker faces the instantaneous demand curve
q(rL) = 1
′b(rL)− 1 =
(
1′Σ−1µ− 1)− (1′Σ−11) rL. (53)
The instantaneous elasticity of demand for margin loans is therefore given by
d(q) =
1′Σ−1µ− 1
q
− 1. (54)
The inverse demand (or marginal value) curve is
rL = MV(q) =
1′Σ−1µ− 1
1′Σ−11
− 1
1′Σ−11
× q, (55)
which induces the marginal revenue curve
MR(q) =
1′Σ−1µ− 1
1′Σ−11
− 2
1′Σ−11
× q. (56)
Intersecting marginal revenue with marginal cost (which is MC(q) :≡ r), we get the
monopoly quantity
qM =
1′Σ−1µ− 1− r · 1′Σ−11
2
. (57)
Reading off the inverse demand curve, the monopoly interest rate is now
rM =
1
2
(
1′Σ−1µ− 1
1′Σ−11
+ r
)
. (58)
Exact formulas for all remaining quantities of interest, like the consumer surplus,
the deadweight loss, and the profit and growth rates that would obtain under the
monopoly threat point, all follow in the obvious way from the monopoly price and
quantity given above, just as they did in the univariate case.
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5.2 General Solution for CRRA Utility.
To close the paper, we indicate briefly how our results can be (easily) extended for
the benefit of arbitrary CRRA investors, e.g. those whose preferences over terminal
wealth can be represented by the isoelastic utility function u(x) := x1−γ, where γ > 0
is the agent’s (constant) coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Applying Itoˆ’s Lemma, one can calculate that (for γ 6= 1) the continuously rebal-
anced portfolio b := (b1, ..., bn)
′ ∈ Rn generates the the following law of motion for
the investor’s utility Vt(b)
1−γ:
(1− γ)−1 d (Vt(b)
1−γ)
Vt(b)1−γ
=
[
rL + (µ− rL1)′b− γ
2
b′Σb
]
dt+
n∑
i=1
biσi dWit. (59)
Thus, the “growth rate” Γ now takes the form
Γ (b, rL) := rL + (µ− rL1)′ b− γ
2
b′Σb = (1− γ)−1 Et [d (Vt(b)
1−γ)]
Vt(b)1−γ
/
dt, (60)
e.g. Γ (b, rL) is directly proportional to the expected percent change in (power) utility
per unit time over the differential time step [t, t+ dt].
De facto, then, the only formal change in the model is that the covariance matrix
Σ has been replaced by γΣ; in the univariate case this means e.g. that the variance
σ2 must everywhere be replaced by γσ2. Thus, the investor negotiates to use the
continuously-rebalanced portfolio b∗ = (1/γ) Σ−1 (µ− r1), where r is the broker’s
cost of funds. The equilibrium interest rate now amounts to
r∗L =
r
2
+
µ′Σ−1µ− r2 · 1′Σ−11− 2γ (Γ− pi)
4 [1′Σ−1 (µ− r1)− γ] . (61)
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The efficient frontier in the (pi,Γ)-plane is now given by the equation
Γ = r +
1
2γ
(µ− r1)′Σ−1 (µ− r1)− pi, (62)
so that phenomenon of transferable utility is preserved for general CRRA investors.
In parting, we note that the stock market parameters (µ,Σ) must be assumed
to be sufficiently favorable (and the penalty parameters r, γ must be sufficiently low)
that the investor is at least willing to borrow money at the broker’s own cost of funds;
this means that the deep parameters (µ,Σ, r, γ) must satisfy the inequality
1′Σ−1 (µ− r1) > γ. (63)
6 Summary and Conclusions.
This paper studied negotiated margin loan contracts between continuous time Kelly
gamblers (more generally, CRRA investors) and the brokers who lend them cash to
make large bets on high-growth assets or portfolios. On account of the continuous
sample path of asset prices, the broker bears no risk of default, for it can in principle
liquidate the client’s assets at the very instant his account equity is equal to zero. In
the Black-Scholes market consisting of several correlated stocks in geometric Brownian
motion, the gambler’s fortune itself follows a geometric Brownian motion, and there-
fore remains positive until the hereafter. A margin loan quantity of q := 1′b− 1 per
dollar of client equity is made for the duration of the differential time step [t, t+ dt],
after which interest is debited and the size of the loan is readjusted on account of the
observed fluctuation dVt(b) of the gambler’s bankroll.
All potential cooperation between these counterparties rests on the fact that the
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market admits assets (or continuously-rebalanced portfolios of said assets) whose
asymptotic growth rate is significantly higher than the broker’s call rate, r. The
broker, who charges margin interest at a continuous rate of rL > r, seeks an ar-
rangement whereby his instantaneous rate of intermediation profit, namely pi :=
(1′b− 1) (rL − r) per dollar of client equity, is as high as possible. The Kelly gam-
bler, who is notoriously far sighted (cf. with MacLean, Thorp, and Ziemba 2011),
is willing to stomach any level of volatility, value-at-risk, or maximum drawdown
in exchange for the highest possible asymptotic capital growth rate, here denoted
Γ := rL + (µ− rL1)′ b − b′Σb/2. In an evolutionary sense, the broker must treat his
Kelly gamblers with kid gloves, for they will hold asymptotically 100% of the equity
on deposit, and (on account of their fixed leverage ratio) they will shoulder 100% of
all margin debt in the limit.
If the broker and the Kelly gambler fail to come to terms (that would simultane-
ously specify the interest rate, the portfolio, and the quantity of margin loans), then
there are two obvious ways the disagreement could play out. In the worst scenario,
the Kelly gambler borrows no cash at all (or the broker doesn’t lend him any); the
broker’s intermediation profit is zero and the client makes do with optimizing his
growth rate over the set of unlevered continuously-rebalanced portfolios (e.g. he is
constrained by the condition 1′b = 1). The second possibility is the one that seems
to actually obtain in this world: the broker just posts a monopoly price rM , and the
gambler then demands the corresponding monopoly quantity qM of margin loans as
dictated by his instantaneous demand curve.
Following Nash’s (1950) theory of axiomatic bargaining, we maximized the Nash
product N := (pi − pi) × (Γ− Γ) over the profit-growth plane of points (pi,Γ) ≥(
pi,Γ
)
; the factors of this product are the respective surplus values extracted by
the counterparies from cooperation as opposed to disagreement, which only yields
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meager levels
(
pi,Γ
)
of utility. We found that, regardless of the threat point
(
pi,Γ
)
,
the gambler will negotiate to bet as if he himself could borrow money at the broker’s
(low) cost of funds. On account of the egalitarian (first-order) condition Γ−Γ = pi−pi,
the surplus value from cooperation will in any event be divided evenly between the
counterparties. We used this fact to derive exact formulas for the negotiated interest
rate r∗L and the final utilities (pi
∗,Γ∗) that obtain from cooperation. Finally, we derived
an expression for the efficient frontier in the profit-growth plane: it is a straight
line (whose slope is −1), meaning that our particular bargaining problem enjoys the
special property of transferable utility (cf. with Roger Myerson 1997). Geometrically,
the negotiated outcome (pi∗,Γ∗) is the result of intersecting the efficient frontier with
a 45° line emanating from the threat point
(
pi,Γ
)
.
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